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Abstract. Existing structured peer-to-peer systems heavily rely on replication
as a means to provide fault-tolerance. Many systems use the so-called successor-
list scheme for replication. We argue that this scheme has grave limitations. First,
these systems are vulnerable to, what we call, Mendacity attacks, where a malicious
peer can lie about other peers to gain full control over all replicas of an item. Sec-
ond, the successor-list scheme prevents the peers from doing concurrent-requests
to replicas of an item. We present, and provide full algorithmic specification for, a
generic replication scheme called symmetric replication. The scheme is applicable
to all existing structured peer-to-peer systems. In contrast to the successor-list
scheme, our scheme makes replicas independent of each other, preventing Men-
dacity attacks while enabling concurrent requests. Concurrent requests can be
used for increasing the security by using voting or consensus algorithms to en-
sure the correctness of replicas. Moreover, concurrent requests can be used for
load-balancing of requests, and to add locality awareness. Finally, to maintain
the replication factor, the successor-list scheme uses a complex algorithm that
involves all peers replicating a departing peer. In contrast, our symmetric repli-
cation scheme only involves two peers to restore the replication factor and thus
avoids such complex algorithms.
1 Introduction
The popularity of file-sharing applications such as Napster and Gnutella has motivated
much research recently in the field of peer-to-peer computing. One strand of this research
has focused on structured peer-to-peer systems where strong guarantees are claimed
on the performance in presence of high network dynamism[7, 10, 1]. To cope with this
dynamism, these systems all heavily rely on replication as a basic means to achieve
robustness and fault-tolerance.
Many of the existing structured peer-to-peer systems use the so called successor-list
scheme for replication. In these systems, each peer receives a logical identifier from a
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virtual identifier space. The virtual identifier space is a ring. In the successor-list scheme,
data that a peer with identifier p stores is replicated on the f successive peers with iden-
tifiers closest to p in clock-wise orientation3. This scheme has severe security drawbacks
and grave limitations as we shall unfold in Section 3. The drawbacks stem from the in-
ability to allow concurrent requests to the replicas of an item. Consequently, items are
replicated f times in the system, but only the first replica is ever used as the rest of the
items are there only as a backup in case of failures.
1.1 Contribution
The contributions of this paper are along three lines. First, we analyze the existing
successor-list approach and its drawbacks. In particular, we point out a vulnerability
which can be exploited by a malicious peer to gain full control over an item and all
its replicas. As a consequence, most techniques based on comparing replicas to enhance
security become useless. Second, we propose a new replication scheme, called symmetric
replication, which makes enables concurrent requests to replicas. Finally, we analyze the
proposed scheme and show the techniques that it enables as well as extensions to it to
achieve adaptive replication and locality awareness.
The advantages of symmetric replication are manifold. First, it is general and can
be applied to all structured peer-to-peer systems. Furthermore, it enables techniques
that can be built in a modular way on-top of it to increase the system’s security and
performance while fault-tolerance is simplified. One of the most important properties of
our scheme is that each join or leave operation involves fetching items from only one peer
leading to better performance as well as decreased algorithmic complexity. This can be
compared to the successor-list scheme where a complicated algorithm that involves all f
replicas is needed to maintain the replication factor when peers leave or fail.
The proposed scheme has been implemented and is used in our DKS[1] system.
1.2 Outline
Section 2 gives the preliminaries used in the rest of the paper. In Section 3, we analyze
the successor-list scheme and point out its disadvantages. Thereafter, we introduce our
proposed scheme in Section 4. After that, Section 5 shows different techniques that com-
bined with symmetric replication enhance the security and performance of the system.
In Section 6 we show extensions of symmetric replication. Finally we discuss the related
work in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present preliminary definitions used in the rest of the paper.
We assume a distributed system modeled by a set of peers communicating by message
passing through a communication network that is: (i) Connected, (ii) Asynchronous, (iii)
Reliable, and (iv) provides FIFO communication.
3 Some systems replicate on the leaf-set. This is identical to the successor-list scheme except
that the orientation is both clock-wise and anti-clockwise.









The rule R describes the event of receiving a message Message from Sender at the peer
Receiver and the Action taken to handle that event. A Sender of a message executes the
statement send(Sender, Receiver, Message(arg1, .., argn)) to send a message to Receiver.
We now give the definitions used in the rest of the paper.
A metric space has a distance function d : I £ I!R satisfying the following criteria:
1. d(x, y) ¸ 0
2. d(x, y) = 0, iff x = y
3. d(x, y) = d(y, x)
4. d(x, z) · d(x, y) + d(y, z)
Requirements 3 and 4 might not be satisfied in a structured P2P system, therefore
we call it a “pseudo”-metric space.
A structured peer-to-peer system has an identifier space I which is a “pseudo”-metric
space. In our model we will assume for simplicity that the identifier space is discrete and
defined as I = f0, ¢ ¢ ¢ , N ¡ 1g for some large N (N 2 N). When we refer to an identifier
in this paper, it is always assumed that the identifier is an element of I.
We can now formally define a structured peer-to-peer system.
Definition 1. A structured P2P system is a P2P system with a “pseudo”-metric space
where each peer in the system has got an identifier from the “pseudo”-metric space and the
choice of the neighbors of a peer is constrained by the distance function of the “pseudo”-
metric space.
On top of a structured P2P system a distributed hash table (DHT) abstraction can
be built by mapping each identifier i in the identifier space to a peer p in the system. We
denote the identifiers of the peers in the system at a certain time P (P µ I). If P is not
given, we assume an arbitrary set of peers.
To make it concrete, we will now define a distance function, as well as a mapping
from identifiers to peers. These definitions are similar to those commonly used in [10, 1,
5, 8]. However, our replication scheme does not assume these definitions and can thus be
applied to a wide variety of structured P2P systems.
We will assume the distance function is defined as:
d(x, y) = y ª x
The operator ª : I £ I ! I is defined as:
ª(x, y) = x¡ y mod N
Similarly © : I £ I ! I is defined as:
©(x, y) = x + y mod N
We use infix-notation for the binary operators ª and © to ease the reading.
For the mapping of identifiers to peers we map each identifier in the system to its
successor. The successor of each identifier i (i 2 I) is the first peer met in the identifier
space going in clock-wise direction starting at i. The function sP : I ! P is used for this
purpose:
sP(i) = i©minfd(i, p) : p 2 Pg
We call a peer n responsible for an item i if and only if sP(i) = n. Sometimes we will
refer to peer n as the master peer for item i to distinguish it from other peers replicating
item i.
To provide a DHT abstraction, each data item d is mapped to the identifier space
using a globally known function H. The function H is typically a hash function, though
any other deterministic function can be used. Hence, a data item d is stored on the peer
sP(H(d)). In this paper we usually say an item d to refer to H(d), though the distinction
will be clear from the context.
3 The Successor List Replication Scheme
In this section we analyze the successor-list replication scheme which is used by many
systems[10, 1, 5].
The main idea behind the successor-list scheme is to take advantage of the way
identifiers are mapped to peers. Since data items are stored on their successors, a failed
peer’s items automatically become the responsibility of its successor. By replicating all
items D stored on a peer p at its f successors, a lookup to a failed peer can be forwarded
to the failed peer’s successor, which then is storing the replica. By having f replicas, even
if f successive peers fail, there will be one peer left replicating the failed peers.
However, replicating on the successor-list to handle requests to failed peers assumes
that there is a mechanism that updates the outdated routing information such that the
requests are automatically forwarded to the failed peer’s successor. For this reason, each
peer stores routing information about its f successors.
To summarize, the successor-list scheme has two purposes. One is to replicate items
on the successors such that lookups for items stored on a failed peer can be resolved by
its successor. The other purpose is to store information about the successors such that
outdated routing information can be corrected quickly.
Our claim is that these two things should be separated. While having routing in-
formation about the successors is advantageous for fault-tolerance, replication on the
successor-list has many disadvantages.
The main disadvantage of the successor-list replication scheme is that the choice of
peers replicating items is defined relative to the identifier of the neighboring peers. Hence,
a peer interested in replicas of an item cannot find the identity of the peers storing the
replicas without involving the master peer.
For example, assume there are a total of 128 identifiers in the system, and a peer
with identifier 10 has the immediate successors with identifiers 15, 48, 49. Another peer
0 interested in the replica of an item stored at peer 10 has no knowledge about the



























Fig. 1. A system populated with peers 1, ..., 7, as indicated by the circles in the figure. The
figure shows the identifier of the items each peer is storing given that the replication factor is 3.
E.g. peer 1 is replicating items 5, 6, 7.
identifiers of 10’s successors. To find the replicas of that item, peer 0 needs to route a
message to the master peer 10 and ask it about its successors.
The inability to address the replicas independent from the master peer has conse-
quences on the performance, complexity, and security of the system.
3.1 Performance and Complexity
From the performance viewpoint, a master peer might fail right after receiving a request.
In such case, the whole operation is delayed since the failure must be detected and the
routing information at some of the peers must be updated before the request can be
repeated.
Furthermore, even if there are no failures, the master peer is a potential bottleneck
hampering the positive effects of having replicas for load-balancing purposes.
From the complexity point of view, every leave or failure of a peer n triggers the
transfer of items on each of the f successors of the master peer in order to preserve the
replication factor. Figure 1 shows an example of this. The figure shows a system with
the peers 1, ..., 7 as indicated by the circles. For simplicity, the system contains the items
1, ..., 7. Assuming a replication factor of 3, the figure shows the identifiers of the items
each peer is replicating. If peer 4 has failed peers 5, 6, 7 need to establish connections
with other peers and fetch the items 1, 2, 3 respectively to maintain the replication factor.
Some of the peers involved in the process of restoring the replication degree might fail
or leave the system too. Our experience with implementing the successor-list scheme in
the initial DKS system taught us that complicated fault-tolerant algorithms are needed
to handle such cases.
3.2 Security
From the security standpoint, the successor-list scheme poses serious security threats to
the system as all requests to an item have to go trough its master peer.
Existing research has already shown security breaches in structured peer-to-peer sys-
tems. In [3] the Sybil attack is introduced, in which a malicious peer in the system
assumes several identities. As a result, a malicious peer assumes the identity of the mas-
ter peer of an item as well as the identity of all the replicas, enabling the malicious peer to
alone control all copies of an item. We believe that it is feasible to use external certificate
authorities to generate unique peer identities once for every peer in the system.
However, even if the Sybil attack is resolved by the use of external certificate authori-
ties, a malicious master peer can launch, what we call, a Mendacity attack by lying about
who its successors are.
For example, if a master peer is asked about its successor-list, it can return a list
of other malicious peers which it is cooperating with. The requesting peer can verify
that the peers in the returned list are indeed peers with unique identities. But it cannot
determine whether some other peers actually have identifiers which make them the true
successors of the malicious peer.
Another possibility is to delegate the responsibility of directly accessing the replicas
to the master peer. In that case, the master peer can maliciously tamper with the data
according to its will. After tampering with the data, it can sign the data if needed. The
requesting peer cannot tell that the data has been tampered with since it does not always
know about the identity of a publisher of an item. Hence, it will verify that the publisher
of the requested item indeed is a valid peer, but it cannot tell if it is a malicious peer.
A direct consequence of this is that traditional techniques such as distributed voting
become ineffective as the peers voting might all be malicious.
4 The Symmetric Replication Scheme
The idea behind the symmetric replication is that each identifier in the system is as-
sociated with a set of f distinct identifiers such that the following always holds: if the
identifier i is associated with the set of identifiers r1, ..., rf , then the identifier rx, for
1 · x · f , is associated with the identifiers r1, ..., rf as well.
Put differently, the identifier space is partitioned into N
f
equivalence classes such that
identifiers in an equivalence class are all associated with each-other.
We now explain how each identifier i is associated to f other identifiers. Let F =
f1, ..., fg, then identifier i is associated to the f different identifiers given by the function
r : I £ F ! I defined as: r(i, x) = i© (x¡ 1)N
f
Figure 2 shows how identifiers are associated in an identifier space of size N = 16 and
a replication factor f = 4. The black boxes illustrate each identifier in the identifier space,
and on-top of each black box the identifiers associated with it are shown in light boxes.
For example, identifier 0 is associated with the identifiers 0 (r(0, 1) = 4), 4 (r(0, 2) = 4),
8 (r(0, 3) = 8), 12 (r(0, 4) = 12).
So far we have only explained how each identifier is associated with a set of other
identifiers, but mentioned nothing of how items are replicated. As we mentioned before,
in a system without any replication, each item with identifier i is stored at its successor
peer given by sP(i). To replicate items in our scheme, the successor of the identifier i
stores every item with an identifier associated with i. This implies that to find an item
with identifier i, a request can be made for any of the identifiers associated with i.
Formally, in a system with the peers P an item with identifier i is stored on the f
peers given by sP(r(x, i)), for all x (1 · x · f).
For example, if the identifier 0 is associated with the identifiers 0, 4, 8, 12, any peer
responsible for any of the items 0, 4, 8, or 12 has to store all of the items 0, 4, 8, and
12. Hence, if we are interested in retrieving item 0, we can route a message to the peer
responsible for any of the items 0, 4, 8, 12 and ask it about item 0.
For the symmetry requirement to always be true, it is required that the replication
factor f divides the size of the identifier space N , i.e. f jN .
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Fig. 2. The identifiers associated with each identifier in the system in a system with identifier
space of size N = 16 and a replication factor of size f = 4.
We now give an informal description of all the proposed algorithms.
Each peer in the system has all its items stored in a two-dimensional f , N -array de-
noted localHashTable. The first dimension of the array represents the f identifiers associ-
ated with the identifier in the second dimension of the array. Hence, localHashTable[i][j]
represents items with identifiers r(j, i).
Whenever a new peer n joins the system, it makes a call to the sub-routine JOINREPLICATION
which immediately sends a RETRIEVEITEMS-message to its successor (denoted succ) ask-
ing it about all items it itself should be storing. The items it should be storing are
specified by the range (pred,n), where pred is its predecessor’s identifier and n is its own
identifier.
Once the successor peer receives the RETRIEVEITEMS-message it initializes an empty
two-dimensional f , N -array called items. Thereafter, each item associated with an iden-
tifier in the specified interval is copied from localHashTable to items and sent back in a
REPLICATE-message to the newly joined peer. Upon receipt of the REPLICATE-message
the newly joined peer copies items to its localHashTable. The new peer is now ready to
receive requests from other peers in the system.
The leave algorithm works similarly to the join algorithm. Whenever a peer wants to
leave the system it makes a call to the sub-routine called LEAVEREPLICATION which copies
all items it is responsible for and sends them in a REPLICATE-message to its successor.
Notice that we do not delete items that are no longer a peer’s responsibility. If space is
required, this could be added.
Figure 4 shows the algorithms used to insert or lookup an item. To save space, we
have not shown the asynchronous algorithm for find the responsible of an item. Instead,
we assume that the sub-routine FINDSUCCESSOR implements a simple synchronous
distributed algorithm which finds the peer responsible for a given identifier (See [10] for
such an algorithm).
The implementation simply makes concurrent insertions to every location where the
replica should be stored, though we do not show it here.
Subroutine :: JOINREPLICATION
send(n : succ : RETRIEVEITEMS(pred,n))
R1 :: receive(m : n : RETRIEVEITEMS(start, end))
for r :=1 to f do
items[r] := Ø
i := start
while i 6=end do




send(n : m : REPLICATE(items,start, end))
R2 :: receive(m : n : REPLICATE(items, start, end))
for r :=1 to f do
i := start
while i 6=end do





for r :=1 to f do
items[r] := Ø
i := pred
while i 6=n do




send(n : succ : REPLICATE(items, pred, n))
Fig. 3. Rules R1, and R2 show the replication algorithm for joins and leaves.
For the lookup algorithm, we only show a sub-routine that takes the two parameters
key and i (1 · i · f) and finds the responsible peer for the the i:th replica of identifier
key. On top of this abstraction, different kinds of lookup services can be built, such as
the ones mentioned in Section 5.
For handling failures, the algorithm shown in Figure 5 is used. The sub-routine
FAILUREREPLICATION is called at the successor of the failed peer with parameters
specifying the failed peer’s identifier, the failed peer’s predecessor, and an integer speci-
fying which of the f replicas to fetch items from. As more than one peer might be storing
the items of the failed peer, a restricted version of our broadcast algorithm[4] is used.
Assuming a uniform distribution of peer identifiers, the restricted broadcast needs to
send a message to one peer on average for every failure.
5 Exploiting Symmetric Replication
In this section, we discuss techniques that can be implemented in the symmetric replica-
tion scheme but were impossible in the successor-list scheme.
From the performance and security standpoint, the symmetric replication scheme
alone does not enhance the security of the system. It rather enables the use of various
R3 :: receive(m : n : INSERTITEM(key, value))
for r :=1 to f do
replicaKey := key ⊕ (r − 1) N
f
respNode := FINDSUCCESSOR(replicaKey)
send(n : respNode : ADDITEM(replicaKey, value, r))
od
R4 :: receive(m : n : ADDITEM(key, value, r))
localHashTable[r][key] := value
Subroutine :: LOOKUPITEM(key, r))
replicaKey := key ⊕(i− 1) N
f
respNode := FINDSUCCESSOR(replicaKey)
send(n : respNode : GETITEM(replicaKey))
R5 :: receive(m : n : GETITEM(key))
send(n : m : GETITEMRESP(Key, localHashTable[r][key]))
Fig. 4. The replication algorithms for inserting and looking up items shown by rules R3, R4.
Subroutine :: FAILUREREPLICATION(failedId, predId, r)
start := predId ⊕(r − 1) N
f
end := failedId ⊕(r − 1) N
f
respNode := FINDSUCCESSOR(start)
send(n : respNode : RESTRICTEDBROADCAST(start, end, MSG(start, end, n)))
Subroutine :: MSGHANDLER(start, end, n’))
for r :=1 to f do
items[r] := Ø
i := start
while i 6=end do




send(n : n′ : REPLICATE(items,start, end))
Fig. 5. The replication algorithms for failures.
techniques that can modularly be implemented in an end-to-end fashion on-top of the
existing peer-to-peer system.
For example, distributed voting can be used to ensure that data items received are
not tampered with. This is done by sending requests to all m replicas and deciding which
replica to accept based on the majority vote.
By using distributed voting, the probability that an item has been tampered with can
be calculated and reported to the requesting user or application. If the probability that
the data in a response is tampered with is p, and m (2 · m · f) concurrent requests are
made, out of which a majority of g (0 · g · m) answers are identical, the probability of






Another possibility is for the replica peers themselves to use a consensus algorithm,
such as the Byzantine agreement, to agree about the correctness of a replica.
The advantage of symmetric replication is not only restricted to enhancing the security
of the system. Symmetric replication can be used to send out multiple concurrent requests
and picking the first response that arrives. The advantages of this are twofold. First, it
enhances performance. Second, it solves the problem of fault-tolerance since the failure
of a peer along the path of a request does not require repeating the request as it is likely
that another of one of the concurrent requests succeeds. We believe that the latter is very
important. Otherwise, outgoing messages would have to be buffered at a peer together
with timers, and whenever a timeout occurred, they would need to be repeated.
6 Extensions to Symmetric Replication
We outline two extensions to symmetric replication here: proximity neighbor selection
and adaptive replication.
6.1 Proximity Neighbor Selection
The symmetry property could be used within the routing process to achieve proximity
neighbor selection. This is particularly useful in systems such as DKS, Chord, and Koorde,
where the legitimate state of the routing information is rigid[2].
The idea is that each peer in the system augments its routing table to contain f
entries for each routing entry, one for each replica of a routing entry.
For example in a Chord system with an identifier space of size N , each peer p main-
tains pointers to the successors of the identifiers p © 2i for all i (0 · i < log(N)). To
enhance this system, the routing information at each peer is augmented with a pointer to
the responsible peer of every identifier associated with the identifier p© 2i. Every entry
in the routing table is also tagged with proximity information.
Proximity neighbor selection can then be achieved in the following way. To route a
message to the peer responsible for identifier d, each message in the routing process is
piggy-backed with a parameter r that specifies which of d’s replicas is currently searched
for. A peer n in the routing process can then calculate its distance to the r:th replica of
d. Peer n now has f peers that it can choose among which each have a shorter distance
to each respective replica of d. Naturally, peer n routes to the peer which has the best
proximity, and updates r in the outgoing message to reflect the intended replica.
6.2 Adaptive Replication
It is often not useful to have the same replication factor for every data item in the system
as the popularity of different items vary, and hot-spots are common.
We believe that symmetric replication could be used as basic replication in the system.
Peers that experience hot-spots could invite other peers to join under the same identifier
to achieve adaptive replication on-top of the symmetric replication.
For example an overloaded peer p, could invite another peer p′ to leave the system
and join again with p’s identifier. That would mean that two peers in the system would
have the same identifier, and p could now tell requesting peers to redirect their requests
to the other peer with the same identifier.
For this to work, peers with the same identifier need to keep a pointer to each-other in
a local replica table. Upon a data insertion request the peers inform each-other such that
data consistency is preserved. If an event requires the modification of routing information
at one of the replicas, that peer has to update all peers in its replica table.
The advantage of the adaptive replication approach is that the proper replication
factor for an item would emerge dynamically depending on the popularity of items as well
as the resources of the individual peers, rather than being fixed as a system parameter.
7 Related Work
Sit and Morris [9] give design guidelines for enhancing the security of structured peer-
to-peer systems. Among other things, they identify the problem of a single point of
responsibility for replication. They point out that several systems have this vulnerability.
However, no solution is proposed.
In CAN [7], several instances of the overlay network, called realities, are used for repli-
cation. The main drawback of this approach is the overhead of replicating full instances
of the whole peer-to-peer system. In particular, each peer has to maintain distinct rout-
ing tables for every reality, resulting in multitude overhead both in terms of bandwidth
consumption and performance.
The use of several hashing functions for replication, which is mentioned in CAN [7],
is closest to our symmetric replication scheme. However, it has several disadvantages.
First, it requires the inverse of the hashing functions to maintain the replication factor,
an impossible requirement. For example, if a peer responsible for some items fails it is
desirable that a new responsible peer fetches those items from a replica such that the
replication factor can be maintained. For instance, assume peer n has failed and it was
storing items with identifiers n1, ..., nδ. To retrieve those items from a replica we need to
find the inverse image of n1, ..., nδ such that we can apply a different hashing function
to it to obtain the identifiers of those items under another hashing function. Worse, even
if the inverse of the hashing functions were available, the items that the failed peer was
responsible for would be dispersed when using a different hashing function, making it
necessary to fetch each item from a different peer4.
Kademlia[6] always makes lookups to k replicas of an item concurrently. However,
this prevents doing lookups to one random replica to achieve load-balancing, or to just
route to the closest replica to achieve proximity or fewer overlay hops without burdening
the system with many lookups to all replicas. This is not the case with our scheme.
From the security stand-point, Kademlia stores items on the k closest peers, leaving the
possibility of one neighboring peer to launch Mendacity attacks. Furthermore, our scheme
is applicable to all structured peer-to-peer systems, which is not the case with Kademlia
which relies on the XOR-metric as an underlying distance function.
8 Conclusions
We have analyzed the main approach used for replication in structured peer-to-peer
systems and found that it has serious drawbacks both in terms of performance and
security. These disadvantages are consequences of requests always having to go through
the first peer storing a replica, leading to a bottleneck as well as a security breach.
4 Disregarding collisions.
The first peer storing the replica is therefore a single-point of failure which can launch
Mendacity attacks to gain control over all replicas of the items that it is storing.
To rectify the problems in the successor-list scheme, we proposed a new scheme and
provided full algorithmic specifications of it. The scheme is applicable to all structured
peer-to-peer systems. In our scheme, requests to the replicas do not have to pass through
the same peer. As a result, Mendacity attacks are prevented while concurrent requests
are made possible. Furthermore, the resulting algorithms are considerably simpler than
in the successor-list scheme as fewer peers are involved in restoring the replication degree
during dynamism.
Furthermore, we have shown different techniques that can be used on-top of our
scheme to enhance the security, such as distributed voting or consensus algorithms. We
also showed techniques for load-balancing requests as well as speeding up searches.
Finally, we outlined two general extensions to our scheme to achieve adaptive repli-
cation and proximity neighbor selection.
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